Capital markets 2.0

In the last few years, a variety of innovative capital markets have arisen to supplement and extend traditional large institutional capital markets. The new markets fill niches of demand for capital and investment, and allow greater granularity of investment information and capital direction. The currency may be money, reputation, ideas, social good or any combination of these. Some of the new capital market vehicles include:

• Virtual World Economies (Second Life, There, Entropia Universe, World of Warcraft),
• Peer-to-Peer Lending (Prosper, Zopa, Lending Club),
  
• Micro-Lending (Kiva, Grameen Bank, Accion),
• Social Capital Markets and Venture Philanthropy (GoodCap, Blended Value, New Profit),
• Ideagoras (Innocentive, The Point, Zooq) and
• Prediction Markets (Iowa Electronic Markets, Intrade, ZiiTrend).

The first category, virtual world economies, is burgeoning and complex and provokes an interesting debate about how these new market vehicles should evolve and integrate with traditional economies. The virtual worlds There and Entropia Universe have had a hands-on approach to economic regulation, for example approving parties for in-world banking licenses. On the other hand, the virtual world Second Life has been more laissez-faire at the outset but then stepped in with prohibitions where self-regulation has been inadequate. Gambling was outlawed in July 2007 and now banking activity has been effectively outlawed:

"As of January 22, 2008, it will be prohibited to offer interest or any direct return on an investment ... without proof of an applicable government registration statement or financial institution charter. (Full text here)"

Risk, Cost of Capital and Acceptable Return
One value of the new markets is that they provide capital in cases that are less attractive or irrelevant to traditional financing entities. These situations often have dramatically different risk, growth and timescale profiles than traditional investments and are conceptually similar in many ways to doing business in a high risk country.

The risk is higher, so the return too must be higher in compensation. Looking at annualized interest rates may not make sense in the accelerated time environment of virtual worlds where the economy (as measured by land and money supply) is currently growing 6% per month in Second Life.

What is an appropriate cost of capital? Anecdotal interest rates on Second Life loans have ranged from 7% per month to nearly 50% per month, and experienced a 20-30% default rate. This is the cost of capital for people who do not want to declare their physical identity details or seek other means of capital. In the physical world, it is not unusual for payday lenders to charge 300%+ per year to cover their high default rates. Peer-to-peer lender Prosper found that U.S. state-based usury laws did not allow the site to charge enough interest to cover subprime borrower defaults.

Virtual economies are chided for not having sustainable interest rates at the same time as the subprime lending crisis is crescendoing through physical world capital markets, itself a reprise of the 1980s RTC crisis.

Law, Regulation and Jurisdiction
The appropriate norm is to comply with traditional governing entity rules and laws, including being flexible with business models in order to do so. Peer-to-peer lenders had to structure their businesses in specific ways to obtain licensing and comply with U.S. usury laws which vary by state.

Virtual world economies will likely need to be even more innovative to receive physical world approvals. The pervasively global and anonymous virtual world medium suggests that geographically-based physical world regulation will be challenging to apply in reasonable and effective ways. However, anonymity is probably less important as an attribute for virtual capital seekers, as when a benefit is conferred, people are generally willing to give up anonymity. For example, peer-to-peer lenders found that people are perfectly willing to have their credit reports posted publicly on the Internet in return for the ease of potentially obtaining a loan.

In addition to traditional law and regulation, new capital markets may face another layer of compliance in the form of specific in-medium practices that develop. Complying with in-medium practices is important both reputationally and in the instance of in-medium adjudication and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Prosper reaches $100 million in loan volume

Peer-to-peer lending company Prosper reached a benchmark $100 million in loan volume this week. With the US stock market declines, credit crunch, raising gas prices and ailing economy, borrowers are turning to novel forms of credit such as fledgling peer-to-peer capital platforms offered by Prosper (US), Lending Club (US) and Zopa (UK).

$100 million in loan volume is an important benchmark, however the overall growth rate of new Prosper loans is slowing as the chart below indicates. Prosper's loan volume grew from essentially zero at the beginning of 2006 to $100 million in November 2007 but the S-curve inflected earlier this year at the $50 million loan volume mark.

Source: Prosper performance data. Note: the default view which specifies 0 delinquencies and 0-2 credit checks in the last 6 months should be removed to view the total loan portfolio.

The reason that Prosper loan growth is slowing is the same subprime credit challenge facing large financial institutions and the US economy as a whole. Initially, high interest rates attracted individuals willing to lend to subprime borrowers to the Prosper platform, but many of them have experienced high default rates and withdrawn their capital or curtailed their lending strategies.

Below is Prosper's ROI by credit tier, comparing the annual return for the year ending September 30, 2007 with the year ending August 31, 2007. Negative returns can be expected for credit tiers D, E and HR (high risk), while even the C tier has now slipped to a zero ROI. Prosper continues to be exclusively appropriate for investing in high credit quality, tiers AA, A and B, where the 6-9% ROI is still attractive relative to other investments, however perhaps becoming more risky.

Source: Prosper performance data.

Prime investing with Prosper

Leading P2P lender Prosper has executed an impressive $90 million in loans through its marketplace but continues to remain appropriate only for those wishing to invest in high prime credit quality consumer debt.

10% of the roughly 2,500 loans listed on the site at any time are in the high prime tier (credit ratings AA, A and B), in fact, most of the listed loans do not fund. About a third of the loans that fund and become active and billed are in the high prime credit tier.

The graph below shows an ROI comparison of Prosper's total loan portfolio by credit rating in two time snapshots, August 30, 2005 - August 30, 3006 in blue and August 30, 2006 - August 30, 3007 in yellow. In the last year, AA, A and B loans funded at 11-15% and have an ROI of 6.5-9.5% once adjusted for default.

Source: Prosper performance data. Note: the default view which specifies 0 delinquencies and 0-2 credit checks in the last 6 months should be removed to view the total loan portfolio.

Acceptable Returns?
Is 6.5-9.5% an appropriate return? It depends on a full consideration of the risk and return profile of the investment. Theoretically, high prime consumer credit loans are low risk; the historical default rate for Prosper loans has been 2% for AA and A loans and 4% for B loans. As compared with the stock market, which has on average for the last 80 years delivered a pre-tax return of 8% with a higher level of risk, Prosper loans look more attractive. 6.5-9.5% also provides a healthy risk premium over risk-free t-bills or money market funds and CDs which are currently yielding about 4.5%.

Prosper's $50m loan pool - high risk, high reward?

Prosper has reached a milestone of $50 million in P2P loans extended, however $10 million of these may end in default. Despite the high rate of Prosper defaults, much higher than traditional consumer credit defaults, lenders should not and may not mind if they are receiving appropriate returns.

P2P lending is emerging as a new credit category, not just in the visible ways of loan origination and delivery but also in the financial sense of how risk and reward are defined. P2P lenders are able to accept higher default rates since they are also theoretically realizing higher returns. Some portion of the 10% traditional spread in bank lending between borrowing and lending accrues to the lender.

It is clear that Prosper loans default at higher rates than traditional unsecured consumer credit loans. The chart below shows Prosper defaults in pink and Experian (as a proxy for the consumer credit market as a whole) defaults in blue. In every credit tier, Prosper loans have higher defaults. In the prime market of AA, A, B and C credit tiers, Prosper narrowly underperforms Experian. However as credit quality worsens, so do Prosper defaults with Prosper loans defaulting at double traditional rates in the E and HR (high risk) tiers.


Default data can be found at the Prosper website by scrolling to the bottom of the Performance page and selecting the Estimated ROI link. Lender ROI estimates are trickier, ranging from a blended portfolio ROI of -1% using the Prosper site data to 17% using the data from Eric's Credit Community.

The marketplace aspect of Prosper is working as sub-prime borrowers have seen the opportunity and are creating most of the volume on the site, 75% of listings and 60% of fundings. Although many loans receive funding that probably would not in traditional credit settings, the majority (75%+) of listings do not get funded.

Prosper is only about a year old and the P2P lending market needs to achieve much higher volumes before meaningful performance can be evaluated. The question is whether rates of return can be delivered which are appropriate given the higher risk from the higher defaults and if lenders can learn how to price default risk effectively in this new credit product.

Prosper P2P Finance Update

A year after launching, Prosper, the eBay of loans, has seen more than $27 million in fundings at its P2P finance site. The firm is celebrating with a user conference confab modeled after eBay Live - Prosper Days - next week in San Francisco. The event is sold out but interested parties can attend the pre-conference cocktail on Sunday evening.

As of February 1, 2007, $27 million was extended in 5,427 loans at an average loan size of $5,000. The average loan size has declined from $6,000 as of November 1, 2006 when $20 million had been extended in 3,372 loans. The mix of loans across credit tiers is generally the same, with C, D, E, HR (high risk) and NC (no credit) categories garnering more listings and fundings than AA, A and B tiers but all tiers are growing.

Continuing to answer the question "Does P2P microcredit work?" the chart below shows how Prosper loans have been performing. The pink and turquoise lines represent Prosper defaults, loans 3+ months late, as of November 1, 2006 and February 1, 2007. Prosper defaults are still stabilizing into a consistent level but have remained lower than Experian defaults, strangely in all but the top credit tiers. One year into the P2P lending business is too early to conclusively determine that P2P lending is lower risk than traditional unsecured lending but the initial signs are good. Low defaults in addition to the favorable interest rates available on the site should entice more investors to lend capital on the Prosper platform.

Another important question is “Does group lending work?” that is, does the social pressure of being a group member increase the likelihood of repayment? Prosper claims that being a group member aids funding and improves repayment but has implemented their group program more like a multi-level marketing program than a true Grameen-style borrower peer group program. The chart below depicts the performance of Prosper group member loans vs. all loans and shows that in the lower credit tiers, C, D, E and HR, the main areas of Prosper borrowing, group loans perform worse than non-group loans.

Social finance has arrived with crowd funding

Peer-to-peer micro-finance is expanding from lending marketplaces like Prosper and Zopa to peer-to-peer affinity-driven financial support for a wide variety of arts, humanitarian and software development projects.

The phenomenon has many names: crowd funding, crowd sourcing, social finance (coined here?), and virtual affinity group capital. Crowd funding is the natural extension of memes like the long tail, smart mobs and social networking and is an obvious capability of an increasingly linked online populace. Social finance is Money Now! - instant market support for good ideas attached to validated reputations.

Several websites are accommodating crowd finance: bands via Sellaband (description), movies via A Swarm of Angels, and citizen vlogging via HaveMoneyWillVlog (using a Wordpress plugin) which importantly lists the deliverable(s) and has feedback loops for on-project progress. Austin TX-based Fundable is a clearing house site for social finance and sees many uses for its platform including project financing for individuals, non-profit organizations, relief efforts and software development projects as well as other social finance practicalities such as splitting the cost of purchases and club dues collection. Fundable's beta site is a bit under-built (needs better listing and search functionality) and their 7% fee is steep (Prosper takes 1% of funded loan amounts).

Social finance projects are most often open-source, and are sometimes executed in interaction with the funding sponsors. A minimum contribution of $10 is generally required and the total amount to be raised is a few hundred or a few thousand dollars. PayPal (perhaps finding itself much more extensible than initially envisioned) handles the mechanics of the crowd pledges and fund disbursement, sometimes including some degree of escrow functionality for the commitment of funds and return of pledges if the project does not fully fund.

The funding levels are still fairly low for social finance projects but as the model becomes more proven, hopefully the OpenBasicResearch.org idea could be used for longer-term science research funding and looking out even further, the economy could shift to include freelancers with consistent regular affinity support as dependable sustenance.

It is exciting to see the power of virtual affinity groups in providing capital in both lending and grant financing models. The next obvious capability of virtual affinity groups will be in providing political support. The impact of social finance, text and video blogs and video clip websites like Blip.tv and YouTube will likely be significant in the 2008 presidential elections.